[Tom Hammond]
In spite of the undoubted perks, the position of the British diplomat is not, at present, a happy one. The desirability and necessity of a diplomatic corps is being called into question as never before, budgets are being frozen and embassies closed.
A chorus of criticism followed the seeming failure of the Foreign Office’s orthodox diplomatic methods to secure the release of Gillian Gibbons, who herself attributed her eventual freedom to the presence in Sudan of two Muslim peers and gave scant mention of diplomats. The barbs aimed in the wake of the Gibbons affair echo those which followed British failure to persuade other EU member states to boycott a summit with African leaders attended by Robert Mugabe.
There is a growing anxiety among diplomats born of concern that both the institution of the Foreign Office and the ideal it represents, an ideal of impartial advice on foreign policy, are being scrutinised by a less than sympathetic government and public, and found wanting. How is the Foreign Office to respond to this criticism? It is vital that it does so, for what happens in Baghdad and Beijing now matters as much for us all as events in Birmingham or Bradford. It is this fact which may in the end be both the saviour and the making of the Foreign Office.
Critics claim that the Foreign Office is ineffectual, unaccountable and remote from the concerns of both its political masters and the taxpayers who fund it. The first criticism is misplaced, the second serious. Politicians will always demand policy advice which serves their often short-term and always partisan agendas. It is the role of the diplomat, in giving policy advice, not to take sides and behave in the governmental interest, but to refine proposed policies, make ministers aware of their consequences and the consequences of alternatives, and ensure they are in the best position to choose between different courses of action. When it comes to making policy the choice must be made by politicians, but diplomats should not be afraid to make clear how difficult the choices are.
The consequences of a fear of raising concerns and challenging ministerial judgements are all too apparent in the conclusions of the Butler report. Free debate between ministers and officials and robust and candid policy advice results in far better policy than a situation in which expertise is not shared and dissenting voices are not heard because of fears of future careers being squashed by ministers who fret that officials are ‘difficult’. The attitude of a minister like Kenneth Clarke, who valued his mandarins and encouraged vigorous internal debate, is far healthier than the suspicion which has often characterised Labour attitudes to Whitehall.
There is more truth to the accusation that diplomats do not do enough to heed public concerns. In the past it was assumed that voters cared about the safety of their streets and the security of their jobs, and that both of these had no connection with diplomacy. This assumption can no longer hold. The dominance of the City and private equity means that British jobs are dependent on the world economy. The flow of drugs from Afghanistan and weapons from Eastern Europe makes Britain’s streets more dangerous.
Diplomats need to be prepared to explain how the work they do affects our daily lives, and why we all need to pay more attention to foreign policy. Without this heightened awareness, and public support for an engaged foreign policy, we have no hope of facing the twin threats of terrorism and climate change, or coming to terms with the rise of new powers. Openness, honesty and a willingness to listen will help, as will according more importance to consular work. Consular officials are the only diplomats most Britons will ever encounter, so their work counts. If consular officials are found wanting, then the image of a fusty, antiquated diplomatic service will persist and the public might well support attempts to further marginalise the FO.
Openness, honesty and humility should also be the watchwords when dealing with foreign governments. All talk of ‘punching above our weight’ must stop. We must offer not leadership (a post-Imperial delusion) but partnership, always making clear, however, the terms on which such partnership is offered. Values matter and the public will not take kindly to cynical realpolitik.
Acknowledging the reality of Britain’s diminished power in the world in military and economic terms means we shall have to pay more attention to our ‘soft’ power, that reserve of goodwill which helps us advance our interests. It is here that having a corps of experts, fluent in local languages and conversant with local cultures, will really pay dividends.
If Britain is respected by foreign governments and their peoples, then our concerns will be taken seriously and our voice heard. When soft power matters, it is diplomatic expertise you must turn to.
