[Camilla Schickova]
Frontline sources report worrying circumstances in small-town British outposts of Helmand Province. Troops are dispatched to extremely remote areas with ration packs that are meant to last up to six months; the harsh Afghan terrain ensures that outposts are completely cut off and the British Army is not able to supply our soldiers with water – they have to buy their own. Within the NATO-allocated British provinces, winning over hearts and minds can only be achieved by increasing security with more boots on the ground. But this is proving tricky with too few British troops, so US forces have moved in to help.
Constantly a strategic buffer in the path of conflict, Afghanistan has been progressively shattered through the Anglo-Russian race for central Asian dominance, three Anglo-Afghan conflicts, civil war, Soviet invasion and now NATO and U.S. intervention. Now in 2008, having “won” in Iraq, we are returning our attention to “re-win” in Afghanistan. The US are increasing troops to recapture Afghan territory (which we appear to have misplaced during focus on Iraq) from highly experienced mountain tribesmen who not only have innate mountain-terrain expertise that was the undoing of past British and Russian invasions, but who also – seven years on – have improved weaponry, greater terrorist funding and an inflamed surplus of allied fighters.
Taliban fighters are anything from the “ten dollar” Afghan – the untrained local guy paid his daily bread to kill an ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) soldier – up to the Chechnyans, Pakistanis, Iranians, Iraqis, even western Chinese, most of whom are highly trained in Pakistan then sent across to the southern region of Garmsir in British-controlled Helmand province. British forces in southern outposts buckle down and shoot as new Taliban and Al’Qaeda recruits flood in from across the border to receive their first bloody fighting experiences. Survivors then work their way up to northern provinces, training and fighting as they go.
Troops an¬d villagers are constantly on edge, living in fear of increased suicide bombings. The Taliban have now realised they cannot fight conventional face-to-face warfare and are relying on IED (Improvised Explosive Device) technology passed on from Al-Qaeda supporters in Iraq, and bomb-makers in Iran; local Afghan’s wouldn’t have a clue how to build these, they’re all coming from the outside. It is clear, seven years on, that this war is not only Afghanistan’s to fight. The overarching War on Terror has clearly fuelled further aggression and helped transform Al-Qaeda from an idea into a reality.
Perhaps the most distressing consequence of starving the Afghan war long-term of military resources alongside centre-stage Iraq, is that distraught Afghan civilians have now reverted back to tolerating the Taliban. This is hardly surprising when the only alternative is a weak government with little control over a corrupt police force. The Afghan police work for whichever side gives them more money. They tax the locals, and are often under the financial (and literal) influence of drugs – one of the main illegal sources funding fighting activities. With no established law worth respecting, civilians are scared of both foreigners and insurgents alike. Civilians don’t want to appear friendly with Western troops for fear of Taliban punishment. Thus local loyalties are clearly torn – those who edge towards the beacon of “enduring freedom” risk everything.
Enforced foreign security is trying to solidify what is otherwise – from a nomadic viewpoint – a blurred border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. But Afghans live in tribes, villages, provinces, not in a globally contextualised “Afghanistan”. American forces will infiltrate village gatherings and negotiate with tribal chiefs, establishing their local problems, how they can help – winning over hearts and minds. They can afford to give village elders up to twenty thousand dollars without justification; the US budget allows for greater security efforts, but long term stability seems undermined when bribery is involved.
It’s easy to say we’ve “won” but at what price? In a war torn country with little infrastructure, money has little value to locals unsure of who is watching and whom to trust. Where there is war there are sides to be taken, it’s everyman for himself.
The British do not have the same financial luxury as the U.S., but there is united emphasis on ISAF and U.S. forces in training and then serving alongside local Afghan police and military forces. NATO-led ISAF continue with their main prerogative in upholding security for the creation of a stable Afghan state with a legitimate government. This is a boots-on-the-ground effort covering all localities, building local institutions such as schools, and giving a positive public profile so as to reassure villagers that there is an alternative security to the Taliban.
But whispers of another thirty-year Northern Ireland are drifting through British troops. Recently the Taliban declared that they will continue fighting for another twenty years if they have to. Have our troops been told about the history of warfare in Afghanistan, how it was once the forgotten frontline of WWII? How we couldn’t beat the notorious “Talibs” nor capture the Faqir of Ipi, a foreshadow of Osama, because of the unbeatable mountains? The terrain hasn’t changed, and the Talibs have more friends than ever. What makes us so sure we can beat them now?
